This post was originally submitted on November 9, 2024. For some reason it disappeared. I also submitted it to the UNZ Review and the American Thinker. The American Thinker said it was too long; the Unz Review never replied. It was not until April 21, 2025, that the Wall Street Journal came around to report what I explained to you on November 9.
Here is the link: https://archive.ph/aQQVR
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My original article from November 9, 2024 is as follows:
The surprise arrest of narcotics trafficker Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada García will permanently change the shape of Mexican organized crime. The total effect of his kidnapping and incarceration is yet to be seen. There has been a slow dissemination of public information, which has caused confusion among the public due to unfounded allegations and disinformation. What truly happened on July 25, 2024, and in the weeks that followed remains to be determined.
The Background:
El Mayo Zambada was a leader within the Sinaloa cartel and became the successor to Joaquín Guzmán Loera (El Chapo), after El Chapo was arrested for the third time in January 2016. By this time, though, El Mayo was looking towards retirement and was turning the cartel over to his son Ismael Zambada Sicairos and to El Chapo’s brother Aureliano Guzmán Lorea (El Guano).1
After El Chapo’s arrest, his sons, known as Los Chapitos, came to prominence within the Sinaloa cartel. El Mayo quarreled with Los Chapitos over the attention they were drawing from US and Mexican authorities and their involvement in fentanyl trafficking.2 Despite their differences, the cartel stuck together, but on January 5, 2023, Ovidio Guzmán López (El Raton), the leader of Los Chapitos, was arrested and extradited to the United States. The remaining Los Chapitos blamed El Mayo Zambada for his arrest, alleging that he turned in Ovidio as a warning to Los Chapitos.3
The Murky Kidnapping and Arrest of El Mayo:
The apprehension of El Mayo is where the story becomes murky. There are two stories that exist: 1) El Mayo willingly surrendered himself, or 2) Joaquín Guzmán López (El Güero Moreno) brought El Mayo to the United States under duress. Within story number two, the narrative splits again. How was El Mayo actually apprehended—was he tricked or was he kidnapped? Beyond the story of how El Mayo was captured, questions surround Joaquín Guzmán López’s motive for delivering El Mayo to the United States government.
El Mayo’s Arrival in the US:
According to the official story, a Beechcraft King Air plane, registration number N287KA, left the city of Hermosillo and landed at the Dona Ana County Airport in Santa Teresa, New Mexico. Another story in Mexico’s Reforma magazine reported that the plane did not depart from Hermosillo, Sonora, but rather from El Zorrillo in Culiacán, Sinaloa. The plane was owned by a company in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, that provided airplanes to PRI politicians between 2013 and 2023. Although no flight plan had been registered with the United States, the same Reforma article asserted that US authorities knew that it was El Mayo and Guzmán on board the plane.4 Upon arriving in Santa Teresa, El Mayo and Joaquín Guzmán López were transported to El Paso, Texas, where they were taken into custody and arraigned.
Was it a Kidnapping?
The initial question surrounding El Mayo’s entry into the United States is, simply, under what circumstances did El Mayo arrive in the USA? Did he arrive willingly or unwillingly? In a 2010 interview, El Mayo stated he would “kill” himself before he was captured and “incarcerated.”5 Because of his public statement, because he was accompanied by Joaquín Guzmán López, and because his hands had been zip-tied (extra zip ties were found in the plane), it appeared that El Mayo arrived in the United States against his will.
Frank Perez, El Mayo’s attorney in El Paso, claimed that his client was kidnapped and taken to the US against his will.6 In a letter released by his attorney, El Mayo insisted that he was kidnapped. And with this letter, the story of El Mayo’s arrest becomes even more obscure.
According to El Mayo, Joaquín Guzmán López brought him to a farm in Huertos del Pedregal in order to reach an agreement over who should lead the Autonomous University of Sinaloa. Participating in the meeting were Sinaloa Governor Ruben Rocha Moya and Héctor Cuén Ojeda, the leader of the Sinaloa Party. When he arrived at the meeting, El Mayo claims he was led into a dark room by Joaquín Guzman López, where he was ambushed and handcuffed. Bound and hooded, El Mayo was transported in the back of a flatbed truck to a “crop-dusting airfield,” where he was flown to the United States.7
An “unnamed” DEA agent informed the Mexican tabloid Proceso that El Mayo arrived willingly, declaring “I’ve arrived” when his plane landed. The New York Times reported El Mayo had been negotiating his surrender for at least three years, but the negotiations “came to nothing.”8 According to Proceso’s DEA source, “there were negotiations and conversations prior to the plane’s arrival. Our agents, along with colleagues from the FBI, were waiting for it in Santa Teresa.”9 Proceso further alleged that the delivery of “El Mayo” into custody was negotiated by his son, Jesús Vicente Zambada Niebla (El Vicentillo), who surrendered himself to the US government in 2009 and then became a US government informant, later serving as a witness against El Chapo during El Chapo’s 2019 trial.10
Did El Güero Moreno Make a Deal?
Much of the news related to El Mayo’s arrest speculated that Joaquín Guzmán López made a deal with the United States. Early reports carried headlines declaring that El Mayo had been betrayed by Joaquín Guzmán López. For example, The Wall Street Journal reported that Joaquín Guzmán had previously tried to surrender to US authorities but failed to reach a deal. In order to sweeten the terms of his surrender, Guzmán López offered to bring in El Mayo.11
After the initial shock surrounding the arrests subsided, questions arose as to whether or not Joaquín Guzmán López really did make a deal with the United States to deliver El Mayo to US authorities. The US Ambassador to Mexico, Ken Salazar, obscured matters when he issued a statement declaring that the US had nothing to do with the capture of El Mayo and Guzmán López. According to Salazar, Guzmán López turned himself in “voluntarily” and that Zambada had been kidnapped.12 Salazar’s statement refuted claims by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that the arrests were the “culmination of a joint Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)” efforts against the Sinaloa cartel.13
Guzmán López’s lawyer, Jeffrey Lichtman, supported Salazar’s account denying that there had been a deal with the United States. Lichtman demurred, “We’ve got no agreement with the government. There has never been an agreement with the government and Joaquín Guzmán López. Period.” Lichtman added, “He’s not being accused of kidnapping. When the government accuses him, then I’ll take notice.”14
Contradicting Lichtman’s claim of no prior agreement, was decision to that to move Joaquín Guzmán López’s brother, Ovidio Guzmán López (El Raton), from the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) in Chicago. In other words, because both brothers faced charges in Chicago, federal authorities with foreknowledge of Joaquín’s arrival moved Ovidio from the MCC detention center so that both the brothers would not be held in the same facility while awaiting trial.15 On August 31, 2024, the Mexican national newspaper El Universal reported that Ovidio had entered the US witness protection program.16
Rosa Icela Rodríguez, head of the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection (SSC), insisted that Joaquín Guzmán López made a deal with the US government to improve Ovidio’s bargaining position and legal defense. During a press conference for President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Rodríguez stated that “there was an agreement between the people who are in prison with the people who are free,” adding that there was “an agreement between them for the respective delivery” (of Joaquín Guzmán López and El Mayo).17 Not knowing exactly what happened and how El Mayo happened to be transported to the United States, López Obrador and the Mexican government demanded a full explanation from the United States. At the time of this writing, the Mexican government is still awaiting an official reply.
Héctor Cuén Ojeda’s Murder:
Digging deeper into the rabbit hole where Mexican narcotrafficking and politics meet, on July 25—the same day that El Mayo was apprehended—Héctor Cuén Ojeda, the former rector of the Autonomous University and leader of the Sinaloa Party, was murdered. El Mayo claimed Cuén Ojeda was murdered at the same meeting where he was kidnapped. Sinaloa State authorities asserted that Cuén Ojeda was killed that night by two assessinos who wanted to steal his truck while he refueled at a gas station.
On August 15, Mexico’s Attorney General’s Office published a press release describing irregularities in the Sinaloa Attorney General’s investigation of Cuén Ojeda’s killing.18 The problem with the investigation stems from the Sinaloa Attorney General’s release of a video that depicted the attack on Cuén Ojeda. The video, taken by a Culiacán gas station security camera at 10 p.m., does not show who was in the truck or its license plate number. It does show two men on a motorcycle riding up to the truck with the passenger dismounting the bike and opening up the passenger door. It is unclear if shots were fired into the truck, but a pistol does appear in the hands of the bandit who opened the truck door. The video then shows both vehicles driving off in opposite directions.19
The recording led Mexican Federal government officials to say that the Sinaloa Attorney General’s office faked the evidence of Cuén Ojeda’s murder. The Fiscalía General de la República (FGR) reported that the Sinaloa State autopsy depicted a large bruise on Cuén Ojeda’s head, which could not be explained by the Sinaloa investigation. What made the situation worse was the fact that Cuén Ojeda’s body was cremated after the autopsy was done, thereby destroying all remaining forensic evidence in a criminal case. Seven other inaccuracies in the Sinaloa investigation were also reported (see note).20 The discrepancies in the Cuén Ojeda investigation resulted in the resignation of Sinaloa’s Attorney General, Sara Bruna Quiñonez Estrada.21 At the time of this writing, the federal government is still demanding answers from Sinaloa’s Attorney General’s Office.
Because the Sinaloa Attorney General’s Office discredited itself, more credence was given to El Mayo’s statement, which implicated Sinaloa Governor Rubén Rocha Moya, a close ally of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador.22 In his letter, El Mayo implicates Rocha Moya in his kidnapping and in the murder of Cuén Ojeda. El Mayo wrote: “I know that the official version given by the Sinaloa State authorities is that Héctor Cuén was shot the night of July 25 at a gas station by two men who wanted to steal his pickup truck. That’s not what happened. They killed him at the same time and in the same place where they kidnapped me.” Rocha Moya disputed El Mayo’s story, claiming that he was in Los Angeles with his family visiting his sister and a nephew at the time when El Mayo was abducted. Rocha Moya stated that it was “coincidence” that he was out of town when El Mayo and Joaquín Guzmán López were captured. “I never thought, not even here, that such a notable phenomenon could occur in Sinaloa, Mexico.”23 In regard to the alleged meeting with El Mayo, Rocha Moya told the Mexican press that “the government was on vacation; I made the decision to leave for three or four days.” “I was not aware, nor did I go because I was aware, of that meeting, nor was I invited, nor did they have any reason to invite me.” “I don’t attend those kinds of meetings.”24 A flight log that was leaked to the media corroborated Rocha’s version of events, thereby clearing Rocha.
Although the flight log exonerates Rocha Moya, speculation remains regarding its authenticity. According to the log, Rocha left Culiacán at 9:00 a.m. and landed in California at 11:15 a.m., which does not corroborate with Zambada’s statement. Rocha Moya flew to the US in a private plane belonging to Servicio Ejecutivos Aéreos. Servicio Ejecutivos Aéreos is owned by former PRI congressman Jesús Vizcarra de Calderón. Jesús Vizcarra is the former mayor of Culiacán and is the owner of Salud Digna, a health care provider, and SuKarne, a cattle company. Vizcarra Calderón has been accused of having ties to the Sinaloa cartel and has been investigated by federal authorities for drug trafficking and money laundering activities.25
Rocha Moya would not comment on the ongoing investigation and insisted that it was up to the Mexican Attorney General’s Office, the FGR, to clarify events. Following FGR’s takeover of Cuén Ojeda’s case, the Sinaloa Attorney General’s Office has said that no hypothesis is being ruled out, including the one claimed by El Mayo.26 The FGR has also issued an arrest warrant against Joaquín Guzmán López for kidnapping and treason (for illegally depriving a person of their liberty in national territory in order to hand them over to foreign authorities).27
Sinaloa Cartel Civil War?
On August 19, 600 members of the Mexican Army were deployed to Culiacán, the capitol of Sinaloa.28 Reporter Jose de Cordova’s sources told him that the Zambada Garcías and Los Chapitos were recruiting soldiers and preparing for war.29 In a recording obtained by investigative reporter Anabel Hernández, hitmen from the Sinaloa Cartel were heard saying that Ismael Zambada Sicairos (El Mayito Flaco) is looking to avenge Los Chapitos’ betrayal of his father.30
While a full-scale war has not gripped Sinaloa yet, murder for revenge has reared its head.31 In mid-August, Governor Rocha Moya reported at least ten murders related to the Sinaloa cartel. Members of both El Mayo’s faction and Los Chapitos have been among those murdered. Martin García Corrales was one such cartel member found dead in a Sinaloa ditch. He was the brother of Leobardo Garcia Corrales, a close associate of both El Mayo and Joaquín Guzmán López.32
Conclusion: Mexico’s Muddied Waters
There are many unanswered questions related to El Mayo’s arrest. Was El Mayo kidnapped, or did he go willingly? Did Joaquín Guzmán López make a deal with the US government? Is El Mayo’s account the actual truth? How was Héctor Cuén Ojeda actually killed? Why was the Sinaloa Attorney General’s Office’s investigation into Héctor Cuén Ojeda’s murder so badly mishandled? Was the Sinaloa investigation a cover-up to hide corruption and to protect Governor Rocha Moya, who had been implicated by El Mayo in his kidnapping and the murder of Héctor Cuén Ojeda?
Up until this point, the Sinaloa cartel has been trying to improve their public image, seeking to curry favor with the United States in order to avoid being labeled a terrorist organization. On March 11, 2024, Los Chapitos assisted the Mexican government to capture David DeWayne Young, a member of a white supremacist gang known as the Ghostface Gangsters, who was wanted on charges of conspiracy, distribution, sale, and possession of narcotics. According to an unnamed FBI source, Los Chapitos “knew that a US fugitive was hiding in one of their strongholds. They decided they would score points with the FBI and hand him over as a goodwill offering.”33 Previously, in 2023, Los Chapitos announced a prohibition on the production and trafficking of fentanyl in its territory. According to Sinaloa cartel sources, Los Chapitos were trying to reduce US law enforcement pressure with the hope that the US would shift its resources towards the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG).34 Finally, the Sinaloa cartel turned in three cartel members who had murdered three surfers in Baja California. The murders occurred in the Sinaloa-controlled area around Punta San José, in Santo Tomás. A Sinaloa cartel associate known as “La Rana” from El Mayo’s faction ran the area. The cartel claimed that they were turning in those responsible as an act of discipline and “goodwill.” Despite the Sinaloa cartel’s cooperation with the murder investigation, doubts existed regarding the cartel’s “sincerity” to turn in its own members. The reason for those doubts was because the area where the murders occurred is a high-traffic area, and the Sinaloa cartel did not want “unwanted attention” in the area.35
Despite the Sinaloa cartel’s efforts to improve their image, El Mayo’s kidnapping and arrest have upended the cartel’s operating structure. Will Ismael Zambada Sicairos and Aureliano Guzmán Lorea seize the reigns of the cartel? Will the remaining Chapitos—Iván Archivaldo Guzmán Salazar and Jesús Alfredo Guzmán Salazar—come to terms with El Mayo’s faction, or will there be another internecine war that will lead to the breakup of the cartel and new baby cartels? Or is it that the Chapitos want out of the business? El Mayo’s differences with Los Chapitos were likely the reason for his undoing. Feeling that they and their father and brother Ovidio had been betrayed by El Mayo and because Vicente Zambada Niebla (El Vicentillo) became an informant for the United States government in El Chapo’s trial, the Los Chapitos have sought revenge against him. Joaquín Guzmán López brought El Mayo in for three reasons: 1) to improve the terms of his surrender with the US; 2) to improve his brother Ovidio’s bargaining position with the US; and 3) he wanted out of the business. El Mayo’s arrest would never be clean. El Mayo was an old tree whose roots run deep throughout Sinaloa. His open letter has exposed potential corruption within the Mexican political system, tainting the Sinaloa Attorney General’s Office, Governor Rocha Moya, and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The real story of El Mayo’s arrest has yet to be told; it may never be told because it is too dangerous. The real story of El Mayo’s arrest has yet to be told, and it may never be told because it is too dangerous. Only time will tell if the truth will come out, but Mexico’s criminal world and political waters have been muddied by El Mayo’s capture.
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